Introduction

A recent review of European Union relations with the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) scholarship noted that there is 'a paucity of studies dealing with EU-GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] relations' (Cavatorta & Rivetti 2014) . Indeed, this academic neglect has perhaps taken its cue from the relative inertia of EU officials in strengthening institutional relations with the GCC. A European Parliament Report (2010: 2) noted that 'the Gulf region (…) has long been neglected by EU policymakers, who do not manifest a strong political will towards it'. Also, two researchers concluded in 2014 that 'there is still no concerted EU policy in the Gulf beyond the thriving bilateral activities of some EU member states' (Demmelhuber & Kaunert 2014) .
While this picture seems telling, it is now not entirely accurate. Attention of European policy-makers and scholars has shifted in the direction of the Gulf as a result of the Arab Spring and the spread of the Iraqi conflict into Syria. The most recent mass exodus of Syrian and other migrants to Europe has increasingly transformed the wider MENA region into a source of instability and a growing security threat, resulting from failed states and the violent rise of ISIS (after the Paris bombings, increasingly referred to as DAESH [Stone 2015] ). The crucial role of the countries of the Gulf in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism is therefore another factor of growing scholarly interest. Numerous articles, reports and books have been published within the last two years on the EU-GCC relationship with a prevailing security slant. European diplomatic activity increased as well, though it still has not secured concrete multilateral agreements. However, the increased academic research output continues to be confined either to security and secondarily economic aspects of the Gulf's relations with the West or to the foreign policies of a few powerful European countries that have strong and longestablished contacts, agreements and relationships with the region, especially with the UK, France and Germany (Legrenzi 2015; Ulrichsen 2015; Bicchi; Challand & Heydemann 2015) .
While the EU-GCC relationship remains the larger European framework for working with the countries in the Gulf, it is through bilateral negotiations that smaller EU member states can hope to build concrete, cooperative and productive ties in the GCC space. Until now, there has been extremely limited research on the foreign policies of smaller European countries towards the region, and on the ways that these interact with EU policies. This paper aims to partly cover this gap by studying Greece's relations with the GCC area. It attempts to define and analyze the actors and the factors that shape the Greek-Gulf relationship and to understand how a small European state in the middle of a serious and deep economic crisis tries to attract the attention of distant, but economically powerful actors within the parameters of the wider European framework.
The paper proceeds in the following way: the first part examines in brief the international politics of the countries of the Gulf, emphasizing on current issues; the second part analyses EU-GCC agreements that regulate Greece's trade relations with the region and presents the main challenges that Brussels confronts; the third part presents Greece's bilateral relations with the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, starting from a historical perspective but focusing on more recent developments. The fourth and final part tries to reach some more general conclusions that may be of use in the study of similar cases.
Strategic Challenges in the Gulf
The GCC was formed in 1981. It has been argued that the main impetus for its formation at that time was the growing security concern that followed the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the start of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980 (Pradhan 2011: 265) . There was a legitimate worry that postrevolutionary Iran would spread Shia radicalism to the Gulf countries which was additionally fueled by GCC perceptions of Iran as a state seeking to play a growing regional role based on its ideology of civilizational supremacy.
Iranian occupation of three disputed islands in the Gulf claimed by the UAE has further contributed to GCC views of Iran as a hegemonic actor, solidifying concerns that Tehran may attempt to fully control the Strait of Hormuz (Pradhan 2011: 267) . Iran's persistence in launching a nuclear program has further aggravated the lack of trust, leading GCC countries to embark on civilian nuclear programs of their own. Moreover, GCC leaders increased military cooperation and political coordination.
The Arab Spring raised new warning signals for the Gulf putting Iran's behavior and capabilities under the microscope, especially following the uprisings and events in Egypt and Bahrain, in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, in Yemen, and Syria. By 2011 an analyst concluded that 'the traditional Arab perception of Iran as a dominating and expansionist power […] colors the thinking in the GCC countries' (Pradhan 2011: 274) .
Since then, as the Sunni Arabs have become increasingly marginalized in the new Iraq, and as Iran has increased its influence throughout the region -especially in Iraq, Syria and Yemen -these perceptions remain stronger than ever. Today, the deployment of military forces and the provision of arms and money to Iraq and Yemen by both GCC countries and Iran indicate that suspicions are running high and relations remain tense (Economist 2015) .
To fan the fire of insecurities and military build-up, questions about US 'disengagement' from the region have been worrisome to the GCC states.
Following decades of active intervention in the area, the United States has been attempting to withdraw from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and strategically pivot toward Asia where the rivalry with China is growing. Coupled with increased energy independence as a result of hydraulic fracturing, the United States is clearly signaling that it is time for its Gulf Allies to take-on new responsibilities (Shayiji 2014). In response to these developments, the GCC summit in Doha in 2014 agreed to 'a plan to establish a joint military command and joint naval force to be based in Bahrain, and supported by an Abu Dhabi-based Gulf Academy for Strategic and Security Studies' (Katzman 2015) .
While the security relationship with the GCC countries remains of pivotal importance, there are noticeable differences between the Gulf States on a number of policy issues. Of particular concern for Gulf States is the rapidity of the rapprochement and normalization of US relations with Iran. The local monarchies hold different views from the Obama Administration on several issues but, most important is the American rapprochement with Iran: they worry that the recent nuclear deal signals 'American acceptance of Iran's hegemonic regional ambitions' (Al Shayiji 2014: 61). There were tensions over the nature of the Arab Spring. Its contagion made GCC leaders view it as a threat, while US inhibitions turned into support for democracy and freedom, once a number of regimes were toppled as a result of the upheaval. Moreover, disagreements loomed over policies vis-à-vis Syria, Iraq and Bahrain and have made the US-Gulf relationship even more complicated. It is the agreement of major powers with Iran on the nuclear question, however, and the rapid change of the world community's relationship with Tehran that has increased concerns about the importance of the Gulf's strategic significance for Washington and has led to questions about whether this rapid change of stance will prove a wise strategy in the long run for all parties involved.
Disagreements on alliances and foreign policy are also prominent in the GCC itself. Qatar, for instance, maintains close relations with Iran and has actively supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere (Guzansky 2015: 114-5; Colombo 2012: 116-8) . At the same time, Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood, a 'terrorist organization'. The UAE has also taken a more assertive stand toward regional Islamic movements, particularly when they are linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. On this position, they are aligned with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. This specific foreign policy difference with Qatar led the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to recall their Ambassadors from Qatar in March 2014. The rift was repaired in November of that same year (Katzman 2015) , when they all agreed to further coordinate their foreign policies in order to avoid working against each other's interests. The UAE would also prefer to separate the issue of the disputed islands from economic considerations: after all, the Emirates are Iran's largest trading partner and Dubai is host to around 400,000 Iranian nationals (Guzansky 2015: 115 While there are differences, the GCC is not in fact as split in its foreign policy agenda as some analysts argue. Most of the Gulf monarchies would like to curb Iran's hegemonic ambitions and limit its exploitation of the Sunni-Shiite feuds, because their own ethnic and religious composition could leave them exposed to outside interference. Bahrain, for example, with its depleted energy resources and its delicate sectarian composition (a Sunni minority ruling over a Shiite majority) has become a strong supporter of closer cooperation among GCC countries (Guzansky 2015: 116) As the situation in the wider MENA region remains explosive, the United States has had to make significant efforts to strengthen the relationship with the GCC, creating a US-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum and discussing with all six countries as a group, treating the GCC, at least at the security level, as one bloc (Al Shayiji 2014: 68) . Other actors, however, have been given space to operate with the Gulf, while the US remains present but less engaged than in the past. These developments offer new opportunities for the European Union and its member states.
The Europeans have also been encouraged by Washington to undertake more responsibilities (especially at the security level) in the region as part of 'burden-sharing'. As early as 1990, Henry Kissinger had noted that 'over a period of ten years, many of the security responsibilities that the United States is now shouldering in the Gulf ought to be carried out by the Europeans who receive a larger share of oil from the region' (US Senate 1990). Nevertheless, the EU, cognizant of the fact that relations at the institutional level have remained static, is more inclined to abandon its multilateral approach and deal with the Gulf monarchies individually.
3. The EU and the Gulf It is abundantly clear that multilateral cooperation between the European Union and the GCC has stalled. The impasse is unfortunate for both sides. While both the EU and the GCC could be considered as leading examples of regional cooperation and integration, there are obstacles and weaknesses that hinder a more productive collaboration, even though a strategic dialogue between the parties is warranted (Colombo 2015) .
The EU is the first trade partner of the GCC, accounting for 13.8% of its total trade in 2014 (followed by China, Japan and India with around 11% each). The GCC is the EU's fifth largest export market. EU-GCC total trade increased spectacularly in recent years from €100.6 billion in 2010 to €148 billion in 2014. About ¾ of EU imports from the region are fuel and mining products, while its exports are manufactured products (mainly machinery, transport, equipment, and chemicals). The value of EU exports of goods to GCC is almost double the value of its imports. As far as the trade in services is concerned, the EU also maintains a surplus (€24.3 billion in exports compared with €12.4 billion of imports) (European Union 2015).
Nonetheless, the EU's share of the GCC trade is falling. In the words of an analyst: 'Six or seven years ago the EU accounted for about 31% of Saudi's imports, but now that is down to 25%, while China has doubled its share during the same period' (EUI 2014: 18) . The same is true of investment. Traditionally GCC countries have invested heavily in the EU (and the United States). However, their investment is mainly of the portfolio type (bonds, shares etc.) and, as a result of the recent economic crisis in Europe, GCC countries have increasingly been directing their investments to Asia (Toksoz 2010: 205) .
The failure to conclude a Free Trade Agreement has been attributed to several factors. An important issue was EU repeated attempts to include political clauses (Demmelhuber & Kaunert 2014: 579) . The particular push came mostly from the European Parliament that requested a series of political reforms in order to endorse such an agreement (Colombo 2015) . On the part of the EU, moreover, the low level of Europeanization of EU policies toward the GCC played a negative role in negotiations especially since, as previously mentioned, member-states' bilateral ties still dominated the discussion. Another significant aspect that hindered an agreement was a condition posed by the EU in order 'stabilize carbon dioxide emissions and improve energy efficiency'. To achieve these aims, 'the EC proposed a new energy and carbon dioxide tax aimed at lowering imports' (Colombo 2015) . This would adversely impact the GCC countries that are fossil fuel exporters.
Political disagreements aside, there are major areas of dispute between the EU and the GCC that impeded progress on the FTA such as tariffs, export subsidies, and public procurement. A study funded by the Commission concluded that it would be the GCC -not the EU -that stands to gain the most from a FTA (PWC 2004: 105) . However, rather strangely, EU member-states 'have not contested the EU-GCC FTA' (Antkiewicz & Momani 2009: 222) . Two sectors, specifically, dominated negotiations: petrochemicals and aluminum. Within the last decades, the GCC countries moved away from relying on basic petroleum exports and moved into the production of high value-added petrochemicals. The second issue of trade disagreements was related to aluminum. The GCC had become a significant producer of aluminum products (almost 10 per cent of global output) while the EU imposed 6 per cent duty on aluminum imports (Antkiewicz & Momani 2009: 224) . Any liberalization of trade was expected to have adverse effects on the EU aluminum's industry.
Though some progress was made within the last years, it seems that trade continues to dominate the talks. As aptly put by an EU official ten years ago, 'The EU position is that we can offer some compromise and give some possibilities, but we cannot allow a completely free hand, otherwise it is not a real FTA ' (EUI 2004: 19) . Negotiations seem to have also stalled because of GCC countries' 'lack of transparency in public procurement procedures and barriers to entry for foreign investors in the services sector' (European Parliament 2010: 11).
A third and important factor for the failure to conclude a FTA was the disagreements among GCC members themselves. This is partly related to the different benefits that a FTA would bring to them (with Saudi Arabian petrochemical industry -especially SABIC -and the Bahrain aluminum industry benefitting the most), but it also reflected the difficulties of GCC countries to act unanimously. EU officials noted that GCC monarchies with domestic social contracts are antithetical to the concept of giving supranational authority to the GCC secretariat and, as a result, it is 'structurally difficult to come to an agreement' (quoted by Antkiewicz and Momani [2009: 223] ).
In many respects, the GCC, with its lower degree of institutionalization, 'had very little experience in collective diplomacy and interregional dialogue and their negotiation team did not have a proper mandate' (Baabood 2003: 274) .
A European Parliament report (2010:20) suggested that, 'given the institutional weaknesses of the GCC Secretariat and the previous episodes of regional divisions', the EU 'should adopt a hybrid approach, consisting in maintaining some relations on a multilateral basis while at the same time starting a more substantive approach to the individual countries'. In a sense, this was a belated adoption of US economic policy in the region that generally preferred signing bilateral FTAs with GCC members (Antkiewicz and Momani 2009: 231) .
There continues to be no specific time-horizon for finalizing the FTA although events such as the 2013 EU decision to end the system of Generalized System of Preferences for the GCC starting from January 2014, which led to the taxation of GCC petrochemical exports to the Union may 'pressure the GCC to conclude the FTA' (Konstandinova 2014: 10).
Greece and the GCC
As the EU and GCC seek ways to restart their inter-regional relationship, member states of the European Union cultivate their own ties to the region. While it is the United Kingdom, France and increasingly Germany who have longstanding ties in energy, security and trade, smaller members like Greece have been looking for ways to strengthen their relations, especially in the economic sector.
Greece has traditionally maintained strong ties with the Middle East. It was the only European state, for example, to vote against the partition of Palestine in the UN General Assembly in 1947 (Tsakaloyannis 1983: 128) , and since then it has consistently backed the Palestinian cause.
Even the leaders of the pro-American military dictatorship (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) had refused to grant the US over-flight or ground facilities to supply Israel with arms during the 1973 war, while allowing the Soviet planes to pass through the Greek airspace for the airlift of military supplies to Egypt (Tsakaloyannis 1983: 128) . As a result, Greece was excluded from the Arab oil boycott. (Mackenzie 1984: 19) . The PASOK government's rapprochement with 'radical' Arab regimes (Syria and Iraq) aimed, in the words of Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, at 'detaching them from the influence of Turkey' (Oikonomikos 1987: 8) . Furthermore, the diplomatic recognition of the PLO was based 'on the similarities between the Palestinian and the Cyprus tragedy' (Huliaras 1990: 164 ).
Yet there were also economic factors behind the Greek-Arab relationship. Since the 1970s some Greek companies had achieved a prominent role in the Arab world where they were executing significant construction projects. Furthermore, the Arab markets were important for the export of Greece's agricultural products. The Arab world continued to be the second-largest export market for Greece (after the EC) throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.
In the first half of the 1980s, however, the Greek extreme pro- (Stratfor 1999) and Armenia finally decided not to join the military bloc (Mirzoyan 2010: 123) . Athens had also second thoughts on the real potential of such a military rapprochement, and defence cooperation was largely abandoned. However, a trilateral cooperation was established, with officials from Armenia, Iran and Greece meeting regularly to discuss common projects on energy, transport and investment. Though not much was achieved, Iran gradually became an important provider of Greece's energy needs, offering extremely favorable credit terms that allowed Athens to buy Iranian oil on 60 days' credit without the need for bank guarantees (Patterson 2013: 134) . In the 2006-11 period, Iran ranked first amongst Greece's oil suppliers (Brakoulias et al 2015) . In 2011, as major oil companies and banks refused to provide oil credit to a bankrupt Greece or asked for high risk premiums because of the possibility of Grexit, Tehran agreed to provide a credit line. Thus, Greek oil imports from Iran exceeded 50% of the country's needs ( RT News 2012) . However, the 2012 decision of the EU to impose a ban on the import of Iranian oil was a major blow for the relationship. Greece, which was the EU country that was expected to lose more from the embargo, was pressurized by Washington to accept the sanctions (Patterson 2013: 134) . In the end, Greece as well as Italy and Spain were partly successful in persuading their EU partners to grant them a longer transition period in order to find alternative supplies. Athens was able to replace Iranian oil with imports from Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (Giumelli and Ivan 2013: 18) . policy remained largely separate from foreign economic policy throughout the last fifteen years.
From security to economics
Because of its traditionally good relations with the Arab world, the dominant perception was that relations with Gulf states would automatically and naturally produce fruit that would benefit Greece in its time of need. The situation, however, was far different. While Greece has maintained a pro-Arab stance throughout the last decades, it should be underlined that its political and economic ties were largely limited to the Mediterranean region. It would, therefore, be a mistake to conflate these countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, Libya, to name a few) with the Gulf where relations were not as pronounced. The Greek refining industry is dominated by two companies: Hellenic Petroleum and Motor Oil Hellas. The Greek state currently owns 35.5% of the largest one, Hellenic Petroleum, which is, however, in the process of privatization. The companies' four refineries produce around 575,000 barrels a day, providing more than 40,000 jobs, mostly in the wholesale and retail sector. Greece is a net exporter of refined products to a number of countries (mainly Turkey). It is a strange situation: nearly 38% of Greece's export revenue in 2012 was generated from refined products, while crude oil accounted for 24% of the country's imports (Ausick 2015) . With decreasing domestic demand (due to the economic crisis), Greek domestic refinery production exports have increased in recent years. An FTA agreement with the GCC could pose a serious challenge for the sector. The acquisition of Hellenikon was scandalous and the development plans are extremely destructive to the environment. We will review this scandalous purchase with the aim of cancelling it (quoted in Glass 2015).
Nevertheless, it seems that other members of the Greek government did not share this position. At the same time, there is much continuity in Greek foreign policy in the region, despite the change of government. In Greek officials, however, seemed undeterred by the negative milieu. The Greek Alternate Minister of Tourism, Elena Kountoura, made an official visit to UAE in June 2015 trying to attract tourists and investment. In an interview she noted that Greece was a 'strong supporter' of the Schengen visa waiver for the Emirates, which was granted to the UAE in the summer of 2015 (Carroll 2015) . Other Gulf countries have not secured such a waiver.
Exchanges continue unabated and perhaps some success can be achieved from the mere fact that investors in Greece can now acquire immediate citizenship by investing 2.5 million euros (assets which can be sold only after 3 years) or are granted EU permanent residency by putting a deposit worth 250,000 euros into a Greek bank account. If there is any hope, however, of building long-term healthy ties with countries in the Gulf, Greece needs to rethink its entire approach to investment. Thus far, all attempts to attract investment have been riddled by a lack of strategic planning, coordination and continuity, resulting in different business deals that rely almost exclusively on private relationships.
However, it should be underlined that GCC investors were until very recently almost non-existent in the country (UNCTAD 2012). The Greek economic crisis and the fears of Grexit proved insufficient to deter GCC investment decisions: new plans were announced and deals sealed. Nevertheless, GCC capital in Greece -as in the rest of the EUconsists of mostly portfolio investments in deposits, bonds and equities (Fürtig 2010: 30) .
Greek construction companies have won several bids in the Gulf, usually taking part in bids along with foreign companies undertaking major infrastructure projects. The Greek company Ellaktor, owned by the Bobolas family, is the leader of a consortium that includes the Indian multinational Larsen & Toubro, the Turkish companies Yapi Merkezi and STFA, and Qataro Al Jaber Engineering; together they won a contract of 3,9 billion euros for the construction of Doha's 'Gold Line Underground' that forms part of the Qatar Integrated Rail Project and is by far the largest single construction package of the Doha Metro (Roussanoglou 2014) . This is the largest contract ever signed by a Greek company abroad. J&P construction, which has a strong presence in the Middle East, has also won several bids for the construction of roads in Qatar and other countries of the Gulf. 
Conclusions
While Greece has prided itself on having close historic bonds to the Arab world (Agnantopoulos 2007) , this has proved far from enough for promoting collaboration with GCC states. In fact, the region had been neglected by Greek foreign policy-makers until very recently.
As a member of the EU, Greece's relations with the Gulf inevitably fall under the framework of any agreements that may be achieved at a multilateral level, even if a particular FTA agreement may not be in Greece's interests. With the important role of the petrochemical and aluminum industries for its exports, Greece has much to lose from the liberalization of trade with the GCC. Of course, free trade agreements concluded by the EU still require national ratification by each memberstate (Glencross 2009: 188) . Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a procedure whereby the European Parliament's consent is necessary for all international agreements the EU makes (Glencross 2009: 104) . Thus, Greece (and other member states) can exert influence in various stages of the process. Still, while an EU-GCC FTA may not be concluded in the near future, there remain important questions concerning the impact of EU Common External Trade Policy on its poorer members that require further study.
Greece's belated diplomatic turn toward the Gulf is a result of two significant changes in the country's fortunes and focus. First, and foremost, it can be attributed to a clear reprioritization of diplomacy toward the fulfillment of the nation's economic agenda, aiming at attracting foreign investment and, to a lesser degree, promoting exports.
Second, the economic crisis itself has made economic diplomacy a matter of paramount importance.
The systematic cultivation of two relationships reflects this emphasis on economic issues: Greece's rapprochement with China (Huliaras & Petropoulos 2014) and the relationship with the Gulf States examined in this paper. In both cases, the ties developed within the last decade have almost a dominant, if not exclusive, economic dimension. In both, the role of private players (businessmen and companies) has been crucial. In While foreign policy concerns such as the Cyprus problem, relations with Turkey, and disputes about the name of FYROM remain at the centre of Greece's diplomatic efforts, increasingly it is economic diplomacy that is taking precedence. In order for Greece to have any chance of success, be it in its overtures to the GCC or its own recent rapprochement to China (Huliaras & Petropoulos 2014) , it will clearly need to re-organize internally (institutionally first and foremost), to set clear rules and goals for attracting foreign investment, and to systematically explore export opportunities abroad. Without a clear plan and an institutional overhaul, outcomes will be haphazard, and economic relations will continue to be based on individual ties and single projects.
